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THE CURRENT PROHIBITION AGAINST PERFORMANCE

APPRAISAL OF ALJs

Administrative law judges (ALJs), unlike almost all other federal
executive branch employees, are excluded from the civil service performance appraisal system.' Although the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act2
* This is a section of a report entitled The Federal Administrative Judiciary
prepared by a study team consisting of Paul R. Verkuil, Daniel J. Gifford, Charles H.
Koch, Jr., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., and Jeffrey S. Lubbers for the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) and published in ACUS RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS 779 (1992). This edited version of The Report is reprinted here with
ACUS's permission to provide readers with a reference point for'James P. Timony,
Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law Judges, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
629 (1993).
** Research Director, Administrative Conference of the United States, B.A.,
Cornell University, 1971, J.D., University of Chicago, 1974. Mr. Lubbers prepared this
section as part of the larger report to the Administrative Conference described above.
While it represents the views of the study team, it does not necessarily represent the
views of the Administrative Conference as an agency. The official ACUS Recommendation 92-7 is reproduced in the Appendix (see especially part III).
1. 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (1988) exempts ALJs from the definition of "employ-

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 7:589

(the Act) makes it possible for agencies to bring actions against almost
all federal employees based on unacceptable performance,3 the Act explicitly exempts ALJs from performance appraisals.4 The Act also created the Senior Executive Service' (SES) for most top level "supergrade"
employees, other than Presidential appointees and ALJs, in the executive
branch.6 In addition to providing SES members with certain benefits
(increased compensation, opportunities for bonuses and sabbaticals, and
limited job protections), the Act also requires a system of performance
evaluations that affects both compensation and possible removal from
the SES.7 Therefore, under present law, almost all career federal employees in the executive branch, including senior managers, are subject
to annual performance appraisals. The major exception is ALJs.
This is not the only impediment to agency attempts to exert managerial control over ALJ performance. ALJs are also exempt from the stan-

ee" for the purpose of performance appraisals. Other exempted employees include
those of the CIA and other national security agencies, foreign service members (who
have their own "up-or-out" system), certain employees stationed outside of the United
States, certain medical personnel in the Department of Veteran Affairs, temporary employees of less than one year, and Presidential appointees. 5 U.S.C. § 4301 (1988).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
3. Prior to passage of the 1978 Reform Act, agencies could bring actions based
only on conduct impairing the "efficiency of the service." L. Hope O'Keeffe, Note,
Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluation, and Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee Accountability, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 591, 602
(1986). This extremely well-researched note was very helpful in preparing this present
analysis.
4. The exemption was created to maintain "the present system of providing
protection for administrative law judges." Id.
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 3131-3152 (creating SES to ease recruitment and retention of
highly competent and qualified executives).
6. See Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1611,
1647-50 (1984) (noting that SES was created in part to address problems induced by
supergrade system).
7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 4311-4315 (1988). The criteria for SES performance appraisals
are, as specified in section 4313:
based on both individual and organizational performance, taking into account
such factors as-(1) improvements in efficiency, productivity, and quality of
work or service, including any significant reduction in paperwork; (2) cost
efficiency; (3) timeliness of performance; (4) other indications of the effectiveness, productivity, and performance quality of the employees for whom the
senior executive is responsible; and (5) meeting affirmative action goals and
achievement of [EEO] requirements.
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dard requirement that appointees in the competitive service serve a probationary period before being granted full appointment.' In addition,
ALJ pay, until recent amendments to the pay laws, was "prescribed by
[The Office of Personnel Management (OPM)] independently of agency
recommendations or ratings,"9 and ALJs were entitled to regular withingrade "step increases" without being subject to the usual rule requiring
agency-head certification that the employee's work "is of an acceptable
level of competence."' The new ALJ pay system, enacted in 1990,"
formalized OPM control over ALJ pay according to a specific statutorily
mandated schedule of pay levels tied exclusively to seniority for all
ALJs. The only exception was for those few ALJs who OPM placed in
higher pay categories, primarily chief ALJs or others with managerial
duties.2
Although the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) contains several
provisions intended to safeguard the independence of ALJs from agency
control, it never has explicitly barred agencies from conducting performance evaluations. The APA's provisions on ALJ pay, as discussed
above, provide that the Civil Service Commission (CSC), now OPM, set
ALJ pay "independently of agency recommendations or ratings."' 3 This
provision, however, cannot be read to prohibit such ratings entirely-indeed it assumes such a rating procedure. 4 In addition, the disci-

8. 5 U.S.C. § 3321 (1988); 5 C.F.R. § 2.4 (1993) (outlining probationary period
required for employees selected from registers or promoted to managerial positions)
and 5 C.F.R. § 930.203a(b) (1993) (providing that probationary period does not apply
to AU appointments).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (1988), amended by Federal Employees Pay Comparability
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-509, 104 Stat. 1445 (1990). This provision dated back
to section 11 of the APA, codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.
10. 5 U.S.C. § 5335 (1988), amended by Federal Employees Pay Comparability
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-509, 104 Stat. 1445 (1990).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (Supp. 11 1990).
12. As of May 1992, only 38 of the 1185 ALJs were in these higher pay categories. All others were in categories based solely upon the length of service. Chart
reproduced in The Federal Administrative Judiciary, ACUS RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS 1063 (1992) [hereinafter THE REPORT].
13. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (1988).
14. Indeed, Attorney General Clark's one caveat to the Administration's support
of the bill that became the APA was the inclusion of the language making AL pay
independent of agency recommendations. Clark reported that the Acting Director of
the Bureau of the Budget "deems it highly desirable that agency recommendations and
ratings be fully considered by the Commission." Letter from Attorney General Thomas
Clark, to Senator Pat McCarran, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Oct. 19,
1945), reprinted in ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE APA 123-25 (1947).
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plinary and removal provisions in section 11 of the Act (which survive
today as 5 U.S.C. § 7521) require that an agency wishing to discipline
or remove an ALJ must bring changes before the CSC (now the Merit
Systems Protections Board (MSPB)) showing good cause for the action.' 5 The MSPB has ruled that a "good cause" charge may be based
on an agency's'productivity evaluations.' 6
Nevertheless, the statutory ban on ALJ "performance appraisals" and
the even broader longstanding CSC/OPM rule that "[a]n agency shall
not rate the performance of an administrative law judge,"' 7 when combined with the high threshold of proof demanded by the MSPB for
charges brought against ALJS on productivity grounds, s have made it
very difficult for agencies to exert managerial control over their ALJs.
One perceptive commentator has written:
Despite these apparently dispositive provisions proscribing agencies' ratings of
ALJs' performance, agencies face strong pressures to curb ALJs who deviate from
desired norms. Agency managers are thus frustrated by the delicate balance inhere.nt in managing a group of critical employees charged with implementing an
agency's policy but nevertheless supposedly independent of the agency. The APA
and agencies' enabling statutes authorize agencies to review ALJs' decisions,
sometimes even de novo, as the primary means of ensuring ALJs' accountability.
However, from the perspective of the agency, the right to review ALJs' decisions
supplies insufficient control. Review permits only an after-the-fact correction of a
single decision, and, although dislike of reversal undoubtedly shapes ALJs' decisions, it does not normally modify behavior as effectively as the choice between
conforming to a given norm and suffering direct adverse consequences. Agencies,
therefore, gaze lustfully at the forbidden fruit of performance evaluations."

Although ALJs, once appointed, essentially achieve life tenure,2' it
never was contemplated that ALJs would be immune from any performance reviews. For example, in 1941, the Attorney General's Committee

15. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1988).
16. For judicial decisions indicating that AU performance could be measured by
agency productivity evaluations under the "good cause" standard, see: SSA v.
Brennan, 19 M.S.P.R. 35 (1984); SSA v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321 (1984); and
SSA v. Glover, 23 M.S.P.R. 57 (1984).
17. 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 (1993). This regulation "has remained essentially the
same since [1947]." O'Keeffe, supra note 3, at 610 n.113.
18. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text (describing MSPB's required
burden of proof in productivity-based cases).
19. O'Keeffe, supra note 3, at 594-95.
20. Few ALIs have been removed under Section 7521 of the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7521, and, as with other federal employees after 1978, ALs
have no mandatory retirement age. See Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(c), 92 Stat. 191
(1978) (repealing requirement in 5 U.S.C. § 8335, of mandatory retirement at age 70).
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on Administrative Procedure recommended that an Office of Administrative Procedure be created to appoint examiners, exercise general supervisory powers, and remove examiners after a for cause hearing." The
Committee also recommended a seven-year fixed term.22
The APA, while affording the ALJs various protections and omitting
fixed term appointments, did provide the Civil Service Commission
(now OPM) with the authority to "make investigations, require reports
by agencies, issue reports ... promulgate rules, appoint advisory committees ... [and] recommend legislation .. . .""The Commission did
make an initial attempt to evaluate and rate incumbent examiners after
the passage of the APA but that attempt foundered. 4
II.

THE

1978 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE STUDY

After its failed attempt to evaluate and rate examiners, the Commission eschewed any attempt to evaluate sitting ALJs, and instead concentrated on the selection and assignment process. Because agencies essentially are barred from any sort of formal performance evaluation, management concerns began to escalate. In 1978, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) released a major study on the administrative adjudication
process25 primarily concerned with the ineffectiveness of agency personnel management with respect to ALJs.
The GAO study found that, although ALJs are agency employees
with virtually guaranteed tenure, the APA specifically prohibited agency
performance evaluation of ALJs." These critical personnel management
evaluations were not assigned to any other organization or person. Without such evaluations, it is difficult, if not impossible, to meet personnel
management needs. The GAO study found that agencies are unable to:
- Identify unsatisfactory ALJs and take personnel action;2
- Make effective use of ALJs to ensure maximum productivity;"

21. See O'Keeffe, supra note 3, at 597-98 (citing APA's Legislative History).
22. Id.
23. Administrative Procedure Act, § 11, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1305 (1988).
24. THE REPORT, supra note 12, at 833-35; see also Ralph F. Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco under the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 HARV. L. REv. 737,
755-59 (1950) (stating that attempt to disqualify 28% of existing examiners failed for
political reasons).
25. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS: BETTER
MANAGEMENT IS NEEDED (1978) [hereinafter GAO STUDY].
26. Id.
27. Id. at iv.
28. Id.
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Plan adequately for ALJ requirements to meet workload;29
- Provide the CSC, now OPM, with information to determine the
adequacy of its ALJ certification practices;"
- Develop ALJs to their maximum potential through training or
31
diversity of experience;
Establish appropriate management feedback mechanisms to determine the effectiveness of an ALJ personnel management system.32
The GAO study recommended that Congress amend the APA to:
1) Assign responsibility for periodic evaluations of ALJs' performance
to a specific organization.33 The responsible organization could be
the CSC, now OPM, by itself or as# a part of an ad hoc committee
composed of attorneys, federal judges, chief ALJs, agency officials,
and ACUS; 3'
2) Clarify OPM's scope in performing its normal personnel management functions in the case of ALJs-issuing personnel management
guidelines and periodically evaluating agency compliance; 35 and
3) Establish an initial probationary period of up to three years to
eliminate automatically guaranteed appointment and tenure.36
A contemporaneous study by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee urged that "[clhief ALJs should take more responsibility for reviewing the work of their ALJs for both quality and productivity."37
These recommendations were supported by evidence that productivity
among ALJs, even within the same agency, varied considerably. The
GAO study, for example, found that at the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), the nine most productive ALJs averaged twenty-nine
case dispositions per year and the twenty-three least productive ALJs
averaged twelve cases.3" At the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC), the GAO found that six ALJs averaged ninetyfive case dispositions, and thirteen averaged forty-four cases.39 The So-

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
GAO
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
GAO
Id.

STUDY, supra note 25.

v-vi.
v-vi.
STUDY, supra note 25.

SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION,
VOL. V, DELAY IN THE REGULATORY PRocEss, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 110-12, 130

(Comm. Print. 1977).
38. GAO STUDY, supra note 25, at 32. The figures are for FY 1975.
39. Id.
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cial Security Administration (SSA), as will be discussed below,' identified ALJs who were performing well below average in terms of monthly
case dispositions."' While these are admittedly rough indications, not
involving qualitative judgments, at a minimum, they present discrepancies that need to be explained."2
Perhaps in response to these studies, and in keeping with the spirit of
the civil service reform, Congress in 1979 and 1980 developed several
legislative proposals for limited ALJ terms, coupled with performance
evaluation by outside bodies, such as OPM or ACUS, with the assistance of peer review panels.43 These proposals, however, were never
enacted, partly because of opposition by ALJ organizations and partly
because election year politics in 1980 dampened Congress's enthusiasm
for the various pending "regulatory reform" proposals."
III.

LAWSUITS BY AND AGAINST ALJs

In the 1980s, legislative proposals concerning ALJs shifted to discussions of the ALJ Corps bill,45 while debates over personnel evaluation
shifted to the Social Security arena. A dispute between SSA management and SSA ALJs over performance evaluation arose in the late
1970s.' The dispute was subjected to mixed signals by Congress,47
40. See infra notes 45-70 and accompanying text (describing litigation between
SSA and its AUs).
41. GAO STuDY, supra note 25, at 32.
42. A more recent anecdote from the Interior Department shows that in 1987 the
productivity of its Indian Probate Judges (then AJs, now ALJs) increased from 200250 to 300-360 cases annually after a reduction in the number of judges. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

FINAL REPORT ON THE ORGANIZATION,

MANAGEMENT

AND OPERATION OF THE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS (1990).
43. See O'Keeffe, supra note 3, at 602-03 and accompanying notes (discussing
legislative proposals on limited terms and performance evaluations for ALJs).
44. Moreover, one potential overseer of AU performance was notably unenthusiastic about this proposed assignment. See Resolution on an Enhanced Role for the
Administrative Conference in Procedural Reform, 1979 REPORT, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 71 (1980) (stating that "undesirable additions to its
primary responsibilities include . . . . [slelecting or evaluating individual administrative
law judges."). Id. at 74.
45. THE REPORT, supra note 12, at 1041-46. Some supporters of the corps bill
urged that divorcing ALs from the employing agencies finally would allow the establishment of a performance evaluation system. See Malcolm C. Rich, The Central
Panel System and the Decisionmaking Independence of Administrative Law Judges:
Lessons For a Proposed Federal Program, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 643, 655-56
(1984) (explaining need for decisionmaking independence).
46. See HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA-
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the courts,4 and the MSPB,49 none of which provided clear signals as
to the limits of agency management prerogatives with respect to ALJs.
Numerous cases have resulted either from ALU organizations suing the
Social Security Administration to block management initiatives, or from
the SSA bringing charges "for good cause" against individual low-producing ALJs pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7521. Each effort has met with
mixed success.
The ALJ-sponsored suits arguably have established the principle that
it is improper for the agency to subject only those ALJs with high
allowance rates"0 to review, counseling, and possible disciplinary action.' It remains unclear, however, whether the courts would have been
so critical if similar review had also been extended to ALJs with low
allowance rates.5 2 Agencies also appear to be courting judicial opprobri-

96th Cong., 1st Sess., (Comm. Print
1979) (explaining origins of debate). See also, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 109,
125-26 (1981) (describing dispute).
47. The 1980 Social Security Disability Amendments (known as "Belimon
Amendment") directed the SSA to increase its review of ALI decisions, expressed
concern over the high rate of AL reversals of state-level claim denials, and expressed
concern over the variance of performance rates among ALJs. See Association of
Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984) (explaining
Bellmon Amendment). See generally, DONNA COFER, JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND THE
TIVE LAW JUDGES: -SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER,

QUESTION

OF INDEPENDENCE:

A STUDY

OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

HEARING PROCESS, (1985) (discussing debate raised over independence of ALJs and
review process of SSA).
48. For an overview of the dispute between ALJs and the SSA over compilation
of AL statistics, see Association of Admin. Law Judges, 594 F. Supp at 1142; and
O'Keeffe supra note 3, at 606, n.84. Since O'Keeffe's article was published, the
Second Circuit rejected an AL challenge to SSA productivity initiatives, finding
SSA's "goal" of 338 ALJ decisions per year to be reasonable. Nash v. Bowen, 869
F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989).
49. See Victor Rosenblum, Contexts and Contents of "For Good Cause" as Criterion For Removal of Administrative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 593 (1984) (discussing MSPB cases).
50. An allowance rate, also known as "reversal rate," Nash, 869 F.2d at 879,
refers to the rate at which an ALJ issues decisions allowing benefits. Association of
Admin. Law Judges, 594 F. Supp. at 1141-43.
51. For a discussion of these suits, see infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
52. See Nash, 869 F.2d at 681 (stating that "[t]o coerce AL~s into lowering
reversal rates-that is, into deciding more cases against claimants-would, if shown,
constitute in the district court's words, 'a clear infringement of decisional
independence"'). See also Association of Admin. Law Judges, 594 F. Supp. at 1143
(criticizing SSA practices, but declining to grant injunction because "defendants appear
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urn if they establish quantitative caseload quotas (or even goals, if they
are unreasonable). On the other hand, agency efforts to promote uniformity" and efficiency in ALJ decisionmaking, including the keeping
of individualized case-production statistics and the establishment of
"reasonable goals," have been upheld by the same courts that otherwise
have been critical of agency actions.'
Most of the cases resulting in removals or suspensions of ALJs have
been based on past misconduct, on-the-bench actions, or most frequently,
other behavior." Cases involving "insubordination" also have led to

to have shifted their focus."); and O'Keeffe, supra note 3, at 606 n.86 (discussing
settlement in Bono v. SSA). The parties to the settlement in Bono v. SSA, agreed that,
among other things, 1) the SSA and its Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) has
"the authority to exercise administrative and management functions over its corps of"
ALJs; 2) the OHA "may maintain records on individual ALJs" including total cases
decided and reversal rates; 3) "OHA will not issue directives or memoranda" establishing quotas or goals. Bono v. SSA, C.A. No. 77-0819-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. 1979),
reprinted in Social Security Disability Reviews: The Role of the Administrative Law
Judge: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 448 (1983).
53. See Nash, 869 F.2d at 680 (stating that "[p]olicies designed to insure a reasonable degree of uniformity among ALJ decisions are not only within the bound of
legitimate agency supervision but are to be encouraged.").
54. See Nash, 869 F.2d at 680 (holding that setting of reasonable production
goals is not violation of APA); Goodman v. Svahn, 614 F. Supp. 726 (D.D.C. 1985)
(dismissing ALJ challenge to SSA management efforts).
55. E.g., SSA v..Burris, 39 M.S.P.R. 51 (1988) (stating that abusive language
toward supervisors would have warranted 30-day suspension; misuse of free mail
privilege would have warranted 60-day suspension; removal on other grounds), affd
878 F.2d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 855 (1989); SSA v. Friedman,
41 M.S.P.R. 430 (1989), (holding that canceling hearings without reason warranted 14day suspension); SSA v. Glover, 23 M.S.P.R. 57 (1984) (holding that vulgarity toward
supervisor, throwing files warranted 120-day suspension); SSA v. Carter, 35 M.S.P.R.
485 (1987) (holding that sexual harassment of employees warranted 70-day suspension); Department of Commerce v. Dolan, 39 M.S.P.R. 314 (1988) (holding that kicking employee warranted 14-day suspension); In re Glover, 1 M.S.P.R. 660 (1980)
(holding that seizing memo, pushing employee, pressing cover of copy machine on
employee's hand warranted 30-day suspension); In re Spielman, 1 M.S.P.R. 53 (1979)
(holding that falsifying facts on ALJ application to seek higher grade warranted 60day suspension). For more on these cases, see Paul J. Streb, The ALI Digest, (July 6,
1990) (unpublished memorandum, on file with ACUS).
Since 1946, agencies have brought fewer than two dozen suits to discipline or
remove ALJs under section 7521. Streb, supra; and cases cited in James P. Timony,
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law Judges, 6 W. NEW.
ENG. L. REv. 807, 807-08 n.1-2 (1984) [hereinafter Timony, Disciplinary Proceedings]
(listing cases since 1946); and O'Keeffe supra note 3, at 606-08 n.86. Removals of
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disciplinary actions." This latter type of charge is strengthened by the
generally accepted notion that ALJs are subject to the general administrative direction of the employing agencies. The OPM Program Handbook on ALJs, for example, states that, "[ALJs] are subject to agency
administrative direction in such nonadjudicatory matters as hours of
duty, travel, parking space, office space, office procedures, staff assistance and organizational structure.""7
Thus it seems clear that the MSPB procedure is a sufficient "weapon"
against ALJs engaged in misconduct or insubordination." The difficulty

ALJs are even rarer. There apparently have been five forcible removals since 1946:
McEachern v. Macy, 233 F. Supp. 516 (W.D.S.C. 1964) (removing AL for failure to
pay debts), aff'd, 341 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1965); Hasson v. Hampton, 34 Admin, L.2d
(P & F) 819, "821-22 (D.D.C. 1973) (removing ALT for acceptance of food, drinks
and entertainment from party's representative), aftd, 535 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
In re Chocallo, 1 M.S.P.R. 605 (1980) (removing AL for various acts of disobedience, misconduct and bias); SSA v. Davis, 19 M.S.P.R. 279 (1984) (removing AU
for lewd and lascivious remarks to employees), affd, 758 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(unpublished opinion); and SSA v. Burris, 39 M.S.P.R. 51 (1988) (removing AU for
insubordination with travel vouchers, office disruptions, long-term pattern of outrageous
conduct), afftd, 878 F.2d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished opinion), cert denied,
493 U.S. 855 (1989).
In 1992, the SSA sought to remove an ALJ for (1) improperly applying Social
Security law and an overly high reversal rate and (2) improperly treating pro se
claimants. SSA v. Anyel, 58 M.S.P.R. 261 (1993). The MSPB's AU rejected SSA's
first reason and accepted the second reason but reduced the penalty to a 90-day suspension. Id. See also Benton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (holding
that ALJs total disability could constitute good cause, but not involuntary retirement).
These cases do not, of course, reflect resignations, or post-charge settlements.
56. E.g., SSA v. Brennan, 27 M.S.P.R. 242 (1985) (holding that refusing to
follow case processing procedures, including routing of mail, use of worksheets, etc.
warranted 60-day suspension), stay denied by, 27 M.S.P.R. 439 (1985), affd, 787
F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986); SSA v. Manion, 19
M.S.P.R. 298 (1984) (holding that refusing to schedule hearings, warranted 30-day
suspension); SSA v. Arterberry, 15 M.S.P.R. 320 (1983) (holdingthat refusing to hear
cases outside area warranted 30-day suspension); SSA v. Boham, 38 M.S.P.R. 540
(1988) (holding that refusing to hear cases requiring travel warranted 75-day suspension).
57.

OFFCE 'OF

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

JUDGES

PRO-

GRAM HANDBOOK (1989). The Handbook goes on to caution that "folf course, administrative direction in such matters may not be used as a means of affecting, controlling, or sanctioning [ALJs'] decisions in 'formal' proceedings." Id. at 9.
58. Agencies, however, will not always prevail in misconduct or insubordination
claims. See SSA v. Glover, 23 M.S.P.R. 57, 70-78 (1984) (stating that criticizing staff
member in decision or in memo to supervisor is not good cause for discipline); SSA
v. Brennan, 27 M.S.P.R. 242, 248-49 (1985) (holding that critical memo to supervisor
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with the disciplinary process comes with respect to cases involving low
productivity or inefficiency. In these cases, all involving the SSA, the
agency has been unsuccessful in its cases before the MSPB.5 9
In the trilogy of SSA-ALJ productivity cases decided by the MSPB in
1984, ° the agency brought to the MSPB what it considered to be evidence of unacceptably low productivity. In the lead case61 , SSA produced evidence that the judge's disposition rate for the years 1980-81
was fifteen to sixteen cases per month, compared to an average of thirty
to thirty-two for all SSA ALJs.6' In addition, his average monthly
"pending" caseload for 1981 was sixty-four, compared with 178 for all
SSA ALJs.63 After a hearing, the MSPB ALJ rejected the ALJ's legal
defenses and recommended dismissal.' 4
The full MSPB heard oral arguments on the case and unanimously
ruled that although "there is no generic prohibition to the filing of this
charge,"6 5 the SSA's evidence that the ALJ's case dispositions were
half the national average was not enough to show unacceptably low
productivity "[iln the absence of evidence demonstrating the validity of
using its statistics to measure comparative productivity."' The Board
opined that SSA cases were not fungible and that SSA's comparative
statistics did not take into sufficient account the differences among these
types of cases.67 The same reasoning later was applied to two other
cases against SSA ALJs with similar productivity records.'
The result amounted to a pyrrhic victory for the SSA: the agency

is not good cause for discipline); SSA v. Burris, 39 M.S.P.R. 51, 60-63 (1988) (holding that failure to stop criticizing agency in decision was not good cause for discipline). In each of these cases, however, discipline was approved on other grounds. It
also is fair to ask whether "insubordination" covers an ALU's repeated failure to follow agency policy. To date, no charges brought on failure to follow agency policy
have been identified.
59. See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text (describing trilogy of SSA
productivity-based' suits against ALJs).
60. SSA v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321 (1984); SSA v. Brennan, 19 M.S.P.R.
335 (1984), opinion clarified, 20 M.S.P.R. 35 (1984); and SSA v. Balaban, 20
M.S.P.R. 675 (1984).
61. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 321.
62. Id.
63. Id. See also Rosenblum supra note 49, at 621 (citing MSPB AL's recommended decision).
64. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 321.
65. Id. at 330.
66. Id. at 331.
67. Id. at 332.
68. Brennan, 19 M.S.P.R. at 335; Balaban, 20 M.S.P.R. at 675.
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won the right to bring charges against low producing ALJs but was
handed a virtually insurmountable burden of proof. Despite that social
security disability cases, because of their high volume and relative fungibility, lend themselves to statistical comparison (at least when compared
to other types of agency adjudication), the MSPB found that several
years' worth of half-of-average production did not meet its burden of
proof without greater analysis of the particular cases heard by the cited
AL. 69 Moreover, two of the ALJs involved in these cases later recovered attorney fees of almost $250,000 from the government. 70 It is thus
not surprising that SSA has brought no productivity-based charges to the
MSPB since 1984.
Nevertheless, this trilogy of cases, by establishing the principle that
agencies may, for the purpose of bringing actions under section 7521 of
the Act, collect case-production statistics, does provide a basis for agency managerial initiatives notwithstanding the statutory exemption of
ALJs from the performance appraisal system."
The "good cause" standard for disciplining "bad apple" ALJs is seen
correctly as a protection of the ALJs' decisional independence. The
MSPB takes the "good cause" test quite seriously and, obviously, an
agency will think twice before mounting an expensive, time consuming,
and disruptive case against one of its own sitting ALJs. This is as it
should be. Agencies should view the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, whether on grounds of misconduct, insubordination, or low productivity, as a last resort.
Consistent with this view, however, agencies should establish other
approaches for assessing and dealing with apparent or alleged instances
of misbehavior, bias, or unacceptably low productivity on the part of
their ALJs. The two guiding principles for doing this ought to be safe-

69. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68 (describing standard of proof required).
70. These recoveries occurred in the Goodman and Balaban cases. Telephone interview with Larry Mason, Executive Assistant to the SSA Associate Commissioner,
Office of Hearings and Appeals, Aug. 1992. See also SSA v. Goodman, 33 M.S.P.R.
325 (1987) (finding Goodman entitled to attorney fees and urging settlement as to
proper amount).
71. In some respects using productivity statistics for managerial initiatives is not
new. As early as 1960, the Civil Service Commission denied a petition from 19 ICC
examiners who challenged a new agency monthly work report. John W. Macy, Jr.,
The APA and the Hearing Examiner: Products of a Viable Political Society, 27 FED.
B. J.351, 424 (1967). The Commission stated that " . . . regardless of this independent status, a hearing examiner is nonetheless an employee and it is both the
agency's right and duty to have an account of his work and his hours of duty." Id.
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guarding decisional independence and peer review. It is interesting that
few ALJs surveyed for this report noted problems with overly close
supervision of work (four percent) or with pressure from agencies for
different decisions (eight percent). On the other hand, forty percent of
ALJs complain of pressure from agencies for faster decisions.72
IV.

ACUS SUPPORTS MANAGEMENT NORMS FOR ALJs

In 1978 ACUS combined these two principles of decisional independence and peer review into an approach to develop appropriate managerial norms for ALJs at the SSA.73 In Recommendation 78-2, ACUS
stated:
The Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (BHA) [now Office of Hearings and
Appeals (OHA)] possesses and should exercise the authority, consistent with the
administrative law judge's decisional independence, to prescribe procedures and
techniques for the accurate and expeditious disposition of Social Security Administration claims. After consultation with its administrative law judge corps, the
Civil Service Commission, and other affected interests, [OHA] should establish by
regulation the agency's expectations concerning the administrative law judges'
performance. Maintaining the administrative law judges' decisional independence
does not preclude the articulation of appropriate productivity norms or efforts to
secure adherence to previously enunciated standards and policies underlying the
Social Security Administration's fulfillment of statutory duties.'

In 1986, in its Recommendation 86-7 on case management in agency
adjudication, ACUS refined and generalized its earlier recommendation 75 and advocated the use of internal agency guidelines for timely
case processing and measurements of the quality of work product to
maintain productivity and responsibility.7 6 ACUS reiterated that agencies possess and should exercise the authority, consistent with the ALJs'
decisional independence, to formulate written criteria for measuring case
handling efficiency, to prescribe procedures, and to develop techniques
for the expeditious and accurate disposition of cases. It also stressed that
the experiences and opinions of presiding officers should play a large

72. THE REPORT, supra note 12, at 1071 (Question 14).
73. ACUS Recommendation 78-2, Procedures for Determining Social Security
Disability Claims § (A)(2), codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-2 (1993).
74. Id.
75. ACUS Recommendation 86-7, Case Management as a Tool for Improving
Agency Adjudication, codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-7 (1993). This recommendation
was adopted by President Bush's Executive Order 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195
(1991).
76. 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-7 (1993).
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part in shaping these criteria and procedures. The criteria should take
into account differences in categories of cases assigned to ALJs and the
types of disposition (e.g., dismissals, dispositions with or without hearing). Where feasible, regular computerized case status reports and supervision by higher level personnel should be used in furthering the systematic application of the criteria once they have been formulated..
Under both the 1978 and 1986 recommendations, ACUS emphasized
safeguarding decisional independence, as well as significant ALJ participation in the development of reasonable guidelines.' Application of
such criteria would not only improve agency-wide performance (indeed,
the criteria should be established and applied at the agency-review stage
as well), they also would make it possible for agencies to better address
individual managerial problems. In addition, the chief ALJ, or other
managing official (e.g., Director, Office of Hearings), could circulate
statistics on case dispositions among the agency judges, creating "peer
pressure" among ALJs.
This "peer pressure" likely would have a beneficial effect on ALJ
performance. Indeed, agencies employing large numbers of ALJs or
Administrative Judges (AJs) who resolve the same types of disputes
(e.g., SSA disability cases, immigration cases) should circulate periodic
statistical analyses of aggregate and individual decisionmaking patterns.
Through this mechanism, each judge would be able to compare his or
her pattern of decisionmaking with that of his or her peers and with
other group norms. The ability to self-identify as, for instance, an unusually low-productivity adjudicator or an unusually generous or stingy
adjudicator, when combined with peer pressure, should enhance both
productivity and inter-judge consistency. Indeed, to their credit, most
ALJs responding to the survey acknowledge that mediocrity of some
ALJs is at least a "somewhat" serious problem.7"
Where peer pressure does not solve a problem of unacceptably low
productivity, other measures should be available to an agency. Under
existing MSPB caselaw, agencies have to document fully a statistical
case to succeed in showing that low productivity is cause for discipline
or dismissal under section 7521." If, however, agencies follow Recommendations 78-2 and 86-7 and develop, with ALJ participation, appro-

77. For a discussion of the 1978 and 1986 ACUS recommendations, see supra
notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
78. THE REPORT, supra note 12, at 1075. Of those responding, 17% labeled AU
mediocrity a "very" serious problem, while 56% labeled it a "somewhat" serious
problem. Id.
79. Supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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priate norms and statistical records, the MSPB route should become
more feasible. This is not to say that chief ALJs and office managers
should rush to bring actions against less-than-average producers, because
some judges obviously produce on average less than others."s Other
techniques, such as counseling, training, and opportunities to improve
performance should be tried before filing charges with the MSPB.. Nevertheless, the possibility of filing charges should remain a real one.
V.

A PROPOSED APPROACH

To eliminate any further confusion about agencies' ability to develop,
maintain, and enforce these appropriately developed standards, the flat
statutory exemption of ALJs from the performance appraisal system, and
the broader OPM regulation prohibiting agencies from "rating" the performance of ALJs, should be modified.
One might conclude legitimately that both provisions simply should
be repealed, especially because the new salary statute for ALJs effectively ensures compliance with the APA's mandate that agency ratings or
recommendations not influence OPM's setting of ALJ pay." Indeed,
given the security of ALJ pay, one possible approach to performance
evaluation of ALJs would be to maintain the section 7521 procedure for
misconduct or insubordination cases only, and simply to subject ALJs to
either the SES s2 or the general employee personnel appraisal system. 3
After all, both systems are replete with provisions that ensure that the
evaluations and resulting adverse actions are fair."

80. See O'Keeffe, supra note 3, at 618 (pointing out danger of allowing production quotas to keep ratcheting upwards: "The purpose of the quota is to encourage
underproducers to catch up with the average. Then the average goes up. However, if
the quota is based on the average, the quota goes up. Standards simply edge higher
and higher").
81. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (describing c.hanges in AU pay
standards).
82. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (describing SES).
83. See O'Keeffe, supra note 3, at 602 (discussing inter alia, general employee
performance evaluations).
84. See id. at 623 n.207 (listing provisions that ensure evaluations and actions
are fair):
5 U.S.C. § 4302(b)(6) (1982) (no employee can be disciplined for poor
performance without being given an opportunity to improve); id. §
4303(b)(1)(A) (an employee subject to removal is entitled to 30 days advance
notice identifying specific instances of unacceptable performance); id. §
4303(c)(2)(A) (a demotion or removal may be based only on unacceptable performance during the immediately preceding year); id. § 4303(c)(2)(D) (an em-
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Similarly, it is not difficult to conceive of a structural system to
honor separation-of-functions concerns and to provide peer review in
such evaluations. Most agencies have (or could have) chief ALJs, who
could perform this task well. Large-volume agencies have deputy chiefs
or regional chiefs. While these chiefs, like other top managers in agencies, are appointed to the position by the agency,"5 it has been recognized that his or her position, and the increased compensation that comes with it, rests in the individual's "substantial administrative and
managerial responsibilities" and not on their policy expertise. 6 Thus, it
is unlikely that agencies would exert improper pressures on chief ALJs
to use improper criteria in effectuating a performance appraisal system.

ployee whose performance improves is entitled to have his or her record
cleared of any reference to the performance based adverse action); id. §
4301(3) (defining unacceptable performance as the failure to meet established
standards).
Id.
The SES performance appraisal system contains similar safeguards, including peer
review (performance review boards) and GS-15 job guarantees if removed. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 4311-4315 (1988).
Moreover, the rate of removals under either system is extremely low: of 2.1
million federal employees (not including postal workers), 425 were removed in fiscal
year 1989 and 403 in fiscal year 1990 on the basis of performance. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF WORKFORCE INFORMATION,
AND OVERSIGHT GROUP (1992).

PERSONNEL

SYSTEMS

From an SES workforce of about 8000, four were dismissed in fiscal year
1988, five in fiscal year 1989, three in fiscal year 1990, and zero in fiscal year
1991. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT
POLICY, HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT GROUP (1992). The newly installed recer-

tification process for SES members has led to nine removals or demotions. Mike
Causey, Big Bosses Pass Test, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1992, at C2.
This level of annual removal for performance of about one in 5000 general
workers and one in 2500 SES members should not greatly concern ALJs--especially
if any application of such a system made it clear that evaluation did not infringe
upon the ALJ's decisional independence. Attorney General Levi's Opinion provides the
guidance that an agency could not reprimand an ALI for issuing an opinion in a case
notwithstanding the agency's commitment to a federal judge that it withhold administrative action. Administrative Procedure Act-Reprimand of Administrative Law Judge,
43 Op. Att'y Gen. 9 (1977). The Opinion characterized the ALJ's action as an exercise of "judgment, which in the context, was essentially judicial." Id.
85. See Rosenblum, supra note 49, at 613-14 (citing Attorney General
Katzenbach's opinion that agencies may promote ALJs to Chief AUs without Civil
Service Commission participation). See also Administrative Procedure Act, Promotion
to Chief Hearing Examiner at Increase Compensation, 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 289 (1964)
(presenting Attorney General Katzenbach's opinion).
86. Rosenblum, supra note 49, at 614.
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Nevertheless, if chief ALJs were given the lead role in this area, it
would be wise to protect them from improper pressures from the agency
by making their appointment and removal subject to review by OPM.
This would permit chief ALJs to engage in normal supervisory and
managerial responsibilities without arousing fear that their actions might
be based on impermissible pressure or motives. Chief ALJs should,
however, be required to submit their performance appraisal system,
including any productivity guidelines, to OPM for its review and certification. This would ensure action by the chief ALJ while also removing
the agency (qua agency) from the evaluation process. If this system
were put in place, section 7521 should be amended to have the chief
ALJ, in the name of OPM, bring the charges against wayward ALJs
before the MSPB."7 Finally, although performance-based monetary bonuses may be problematic, there is no reason why the chief ALJ could
not be authorized to recommend nonmonetary awards or commendations
to outstanding ALJs.
The success of this approach to performance appraisal depends heavily on participation of ALJs in the development of appropriate performance criteria and guidelines. In some situations, peer review of problem performers can be useful as well. Several agencies, in fact, already
have instituted peer review for certain types of complaints or allegations
against ALJs. The Department of Labor's Office of Administrative Law
Judges (DOL ALJs) has established peer review procedures for handling
complaints of misconduct or disability on the part of ALJs. s The DOL
ALJs have set up an informal inquiry advisory committee consisting of
three members selected by the Chief ALJ from a panel of six judges
elected by the DOL ALJs. Although not frequently used,89 this proce-

87. It might be argued that it is unnecessary to institute a somewhat cumbersome
and possibly disruptive system of annual performance appraisal of all ALJs. Arguably,
it might be sufficient to amend the performance appraisal exemption to allow agencies
to appraise ALJs on an individual basis as a prelude to bringing a charge under
section 7521. Chief ALJs then would wait until sufficient "probable cause" was established before undertaking a written appraisal of an AL's performance, thus giving the
ALJ a chance to respond to the appraisal and to improve his or her performance.
This would add to the notice, fairness, and documentation of an ensuing action at the
MSPB.
88. See 46 Fed. Reg. 28,050 (1981), amended at 46 Fed. Reg. 30,843 (1983) and
52 Fed. Reg. 32,973 (1987) (providing amended procedures for internal handling of
complaints of misconduct or disability of DOL ALJs).
89. See O'Keeffe, supra note 3, at 625 n.219 (reporting that procedure has been
invoked twice as of 1985). According to the Deputy Chief ALJ, the procedure has
not been invoked in the past five years, although it has been "suggested" several
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dure is a good model for other large ALJ corps. The SSA recently has
defended several class action lawsuits alleging that several ALJs were
biased' and has instituted a similar procedure modeled on the peer
system for allegations of misconduct by federal Article IH judgreview
91
es.
Obviously, agencies with fewer judges will find it more difficult to
set up peer review panels (although the SES performance review board
system copes with this by rotating peers from among the smaller agencies). On the other hand, chief ALJs in these agencies will have a closer
relationship with individual ALJs, thus making many of the managerial
tasks easier. Moreover, the promulgation of a model code of judicial
conduct for ALJs' will help provide significant assistance in misconduct or complaint cases.
Finally, one aspect of the MSPB process during a "good cause" hearing merits reform: the Board at present, and for over a decade, has
employed only a single ALJ to preside over misconduct cases (and a
few other low-volume categories of cases).93 This places that individual
ALJ in the uncomfortable position of repeatedly having to judge his
times. Interview with John Vittone, Deputy Chief AL, DOL (Feb. 1992).
90. For a description of these cases, see Judicial Independence of Administrative
Law Judges at the Social Security Administration, Hearings before the House
Subcomm. on Social Security, of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 72 (1990) (statement of Jonathan M. Stein, General Counsel, Community
Legal Services, Inc.). These allegations have led to a GAO investigation that concluded that ALJ decisions had shown a statistically significant bias against black applicants. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: RACIAL DIFFERENCE IN DISABILITY DECISIONS WARRANT

FURTHER INVESTIGATION (1992).

The GAO study dis-

closes that more than 10% of SSA ALJs had allowance rates that disfavored black
claimants by more than 25%. Id. See also Stephen Labaton, Benefits Are Refused
More Often to Disabled Blacks, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMEs, May 11, 1992 at Al. SSA
Commissioner King raised concerns about GAO's methodology but also pledged vigorously to deal with the problems raised by the report. Letter from Commissioner King,
to Lawrence J. Thompson, GAO (Feb. 4, 1992), reprinted in GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: RACIAL DIFFERENCE IN DISABILITY

DECISIONS WARRANT

FURTHER INVESTIGATION 74-76 (1992).

91. For a description of SSA procedures, see Social Security Administration Procedures Concerning Allegations of Bias or Misconduct by Administrative Law Judges,
57 Fed. Reg. 49,186 (1992); and Proposed Amended Rules for the Processing of Certificates That a Judicial Officer Might Have Engaged in Impeachable Conduct, Judicial Conference of-the United States, 56 Fed. Reg. 66,644 (1991).
92. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES (1989).

93. In 1993, the MSPB's only ALI retired, and the agency began borrowing
ALJs to hear these cases. Telephone interview with OPM, November 1993.
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peers with no realistic chance of recusal. Given the nature of these cases, it would be far better for MSPB to expand its pool of available
ALJs to hear such cases.
It has been suggested that MSPB could have these cases heard by a
panel of three ALJs, with two of them employed by agencies other than
the MSPB or the prosecuting agency, and assigned in rotation from a
list kept by OPM.' Multi-judge peer review panels are common in
both the states and federal system95 and could be incorporated easily
into the MSPB procedure."
VI.

EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
AT THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVEL

Evaluation of judicial performance is hardly a new or radical idea.
Evaluation programs exist at both the federal and state court levels, and
ALJs in a large number of states are also subject to performance evaluation.
The American Bar Association (ABA) has issued Guidelines concerning the proper role of such evaluations that supply specific performance
measures to be applied.' The ABA Guidelines recognize that ALJ
evaluation programs should be "structured and implemented so as not to
impair the independence of the judiciary."" The ABA Guidelines also
encourage performance evaluations for "self-improvement," "effective
assignment and use of judges within the judiciary," "improved design
and content of continuing judicial evaluation programs," and "retention

94. See Timony, Disciplinary Procedures, supra note 55, at 820 (discussing proposed structural changes in adjudication of cases involving AUs); and James P.
Timony, Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law Judges, 7 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 629 (1993) (proposing alternative to ACUS recommendations on performance evaluations).
95. Timony, Disciplinary Procedures, supra note 55, at 809 .(citing California's
commission system in particular).
96. Indeed, this would not require a statutory amendment because the APA permits agencies to use "one or more" ALJs to preside over hearings. 5 U.S.C. §
556(b)(3) (1988). Furthermore, OPM administers an AU "loan program" where "[a]n
agency . . . which occasionally or temporarily is insufficiently staffed with
[ALJs] . . . may use [ALJs] selected by [OPM] with the consent of other agencies."
5 U.S.C. § 3344 (1988). If the many MSPB AJs were converted to ALJs, the need
for loans would be eliminated.
97. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE,
GUIDELINES

FOR

THE

EVALUATION

(hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES).
98. Id., Guideline 1-2, at ix.

OF

JUDICIAL

PERFORMANCE

(Aug.

1985)
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or continuation of judges in office." 99
The ABA Guidelines -provide the following criteria for performance
evaluation:'°"
Integrity-avoidance of impropriety and appearance of impropriety, freedom from bias, impartiality; 0 '
(2) Knowledge and understanding of the law-legally sound decisions, knowledge of substantive, procedural and evidentiary law
of the jurisdiction, proper application of judicial precedent; 2
(3) Communication skills-clarity of bench rulings and other oral
communications, quality of written opinions, sensitivity to the
impact of demeanor and other non-verbal communications;0 3
(4) Preparation, attentiveness and control over proceedings--courtesy to all parties, willingness to allow legally interested persons to be heard unless precluded by law;'
(5) Managerial skills-devoting appropriate time to pending matters,
discharging administrative responsibilities diligently;' °5
(6) Punctuality-prompt disposition of pending matters and meeting
commitments of time according to rules of court;
(7) Service to the profession-attendanceat and participation in continuing legal education, ensuring that the court is serving the
public to the best of its ability;'0 7
(8) Effectiveness in working with other judges--extending ideas and
opinions when on multi-judge panel, soundly critiquing work of
colleagues."0 '
Whether or not they follow the ABA Guidelines, judicial evaluation
programs increasingly are used at the state level. According to the latest
survey of state activity, "six states and the courts of the Navajo Nation
operate judicial evaluation programs, and eight states are actively developing a program or are close to implementing one."'' °" The purposes of
(1)

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
Comes

Id., Guideline 1-1, at ix.
Id., Guideline 3-0, at x.
Id., Guideline 3-1, at x.
ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 97, Guideline 3-2, at x.
Id., Guideline 3-3, at xi.
Id., Guideline 3-4, at xi.
Id., Guideline 3-5, at xi.
Id., Guideline 3-6, at xi.
ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 97, Guideline 3-7, .at xii.
Id., Guideline 3-8, at xii.
Susan Keilitz and Judith White McBride, Judicial Performance Evaluation
of Age, 16 STATE CT. J. 4, 6-9 (1992). The six states with established pro-
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some of these programs include generating information to be used in
judicial retention elections or in reappointment decisions."0
The federal judiciary also has shown interest in judicial evaluation.
Under the auspices of a Judicial Conference Subcommittee on Judicial
Evaluation, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois
recently completed a pilot judicial evaluation project involving the voluntary participation of judges and attorneys."' The report on this pilot
project states that "the response of participants was overwhelmingly
positive.""' 2 In addition, the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeals have used performance evaluations in making retention decisions for bankruptcy judges and magistrates." 3 Finally, Congress has
expressed its concerns about current arrangements relating to discipline
and removal of federal judges by creating the blue-ribbon National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, which recently published its report recommending, among other things, consideration of a
judicial evaluation program in the federal courts." 4
Within the state administrative judiciary, there is considerable use of
performance evaluation. All but four of the eighteen states (plus New
York City) that have adopted the "central panel" model of agency adjudication, whereby some or all state ALJs are located in a central organization to be assigned to agency cases on an as-needed basis,"' use at
least the normal type of civil service evaluation. Eight states (plus New
York City) submitted to ACUS specially tailored performance appraisal
forms for their judges, and one state, Maryland, submitted its proposed
6
plan."
grams are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, and Utah. The eight
states developing such programs are Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota,
New Mexico, North Dakota, and Washington. Id. See also, EDWARD D. FEIGENBAUM,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS-INNOVATIONS, STATEWIDE JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: How NEW JERSEY JUDGES THE JUDGES (1984).

110. Id.
111. DARLENE R. DAVIS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE JUDICIAL EVALUATION
PILOT PROJECT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
(1991).

112.
113.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2-3.

114.

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL

COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND

RE-

MOVAL 155 (1993).

115. The 18 states are California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Telephone Interview
with Tracey Brown, Editor, The Central Panel, Lutherville, MD, (Feb. 1992).
116. The eight states submitting appraisal forms were Colorado, Florida, Minnesota,
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Perhaps the most sophisticated evaluation program is New
Jersey's. "7 The New Jersey Office of Administrative Law has developed an evaluation system designed to reflect performance of ALJs, to
indicate the need for improvement, and also to assist in the Governor's
reappointment decisions." 8 The system, using a combination of performance evaluation techniques, focuses on three areas of judicial performance: competence, conduct, and productivity." 9
The ALJ's competence, in New Jersey's system, is evaluated primarily based on the judge's written decisions. The New Jersey Office of
Administrative Law randomly selects decisions in the judge's area of expertise and reviews them for factors such as structure and substance,
including: clarity, proper differentiation of significant and insignificant
facts, and proper consideration of statutory, regulatory, and constitutional
principles."
The conduct of an ALJ is evaluated primarily through the use of
case-specific questionnaires directed to counsel and parties on a random
basis. Attorneys, pro se litigants, other litigants, and state agencies receive separate questionnaires. The attorney questionnaires are quite technical and relate to substantive legal issues as well as to settlement skills.
The party questionnaires are less technical and relate more to the
judge's conduct of the hearing and ability to explain the process to the
litigant. The agency's questionnaire is mainly concerned with the judge's
written decision, but also includes topics such as the judge's compliance
with timeframes."'
In addition, the New Jersey system evaluates how the ALJ handles
his or her caseload. Computer generated reports indicate the average

New Jersey, North Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. (On file with
ACUS).
117. Telephone Interview with Randye E. Bloom, Assistant Director, Judicial Evaluation and Education, New Jersey Office of Administrative Law (July 1992) (confirming written materials on file at ACUS).
118. New Jersey ALJs initially are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by
the Senate for a one-year term. After the first year, the Governor may reappoint
(without Senate confirmation) for four additional years. Subsequent reappointments are
for five-year terms and require Senate confirmation. The New Jersey Office of Administrative Law conducts evaluations every year for the first five-year term, in only
the fourth and fifth years of the second term, and in the fifth year of the third term.
When reappointment- decisions are pending, the Director sends a confidential letter to
the Governor about the incumbent based on the evaluations. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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time per case, average time from the judge's receipt of the file to the
issuance of a decision, and other administrative timing matters. After all
of the above data is gathered, each judge is afforded an opportunity to
review the collected information.' The New Jersey Office of Administrative Law formerly used four performance levels (marginal, acceptable, commendable and distinguished), but eliminated these ratings when
it stopped using evaluations for salary review." Today, the Office
simply provides the AU with the summary results of the evaluation. 4
In general, the evaluation criteria in the state central panels concentrate on three main areas: (1) the ability to preside over hearings, i.e., in
conducting orderly, speedy hearings and applying appropriate procedures
and principles of law; (2) adequacy of decisionmaking; and (3) interpersonal relations with staff, and caseload management. In most states, the
chief AU or panel director does the evaluating (although Idaho, Oregon,
and Washington have a unique arrangement of evaluating each other's
AIJs).' In some states, the purpose of the evaluation (beyond meeting usual civil service requirements) is not explained, although several
states explicitly use such evaluations for counseling, training, reassignment, advancement, and even salary adjustments.'26
Finally, federal AJs, unlike ALJs, are not exempt from performance
appraisal, and several important groups of AJs, such as those at MSPB,
the Department of Defense Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance
Review (DISCR), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, and the Department of Health and Human Services Departmental Appeals Board,
are subject to performance ratings. 27
CONCLUSION

Although the APA's procedure for disciplining or removing ALJs for
cause after a hearing before the MSPB has worked relatively well in
misconduct or insubordination cases (except for the overreliance on the

122. Telephone Interview with Randye E. Bloom, supra note 117.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Telephone Interview with David R. LaRose, Chief Administrative Law Judge,
State of Washington Office of Administrative Hearings (July 1992).
126. Appraisal forms on file at ACUS, supra note 116.
127. THE REPORT, supra note 12, at 1031. Among the actual appraisal forms on
file at ACUS are those applicable to AJs at MSPB, Dep.artment of Defense Directorate for Industrial Security, Clearance Review (DISCR), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, and the Department of Health and Human Services Departmental Appeals
Board.
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single ALJ at MSPB), the procedure has not provided a realistic forum
for agency dissatisfaction with low-producing ALJs. In misconduct cases,
insubordination cases, and judicial disability cases, agencies with a large
corps of ALJs should establish peer review panels for handling complaints and for triggering MSPB actions. To assist agencies in holding
ALJs accountable for unduly low productivity, the statutory and regulatory impediments to performance appraisals and ratings should either be
eliminated or at least modified to clarify that chief ALJs are responsible
for the overall management of ALJ performance. Such responsibilities
should include developing (with the input of ALJs and advisory groups)
appropriate case-processing guidelines; collecting, maintaining, and disseminating data on individual ALJ performance pursuant to those
guidelines; conducting performance appraisals of ALJs at appropriate
intervals; undertaking counseling, training, or other ameliorative activities; and, where good cause exists, bringing charges against individual
ALJs before the MSPB. Chief ALJs, when assigned these specific managerial responsibilities, also should be granted additional independence
from agency control by making their appointment and removal subject
to OPM review. Establishment of such a system would bring the federal
administrative judiciary into the mainstream of judicial administration as
it is now practiced in many leading jurisdictions throughout the nation
and would improve the development of administrative law.
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Appendix

Recommendation of the Administrative Conference of The
United States*
THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY
(RECOMMENDATION No. 92-7)'"

At the request of the Office of Personnel Management, the Administrative Conference undertook a study of a series of issues relating to the
roles of Federal administrative law judges (ALJs) and non-ALJ adjudicators, or administrative judges (AJs),' as they have evolved over the last
several decades. The study addressed a number of different issues, including those relating to selection and evaluation of ALJs and AJs, the
relationship of ALJs and AJs to their employing agencies, including the
appropriate level of "independence" of such decisionmakers, and under
what circumstances each type of decisionmaker should be used. Many of
these issues are controversial, and the Conference has heard strong arguments from those with differing views.
The Administrative Conference takes as its starting point in considering the role of the Federal administrative judiciary the role created for
"hearing examiners," now redesignated as "administrative law judges," in
the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.2 That Act contemplated the
existence of impartial factfinders, with substantive expertise in the sub-

This Appendix is an exact reproduction of the Recommendation as it appeared in the Code of Federal Regulations. For an explanation of the publication
policy regarding these recommendations, see 1 C.F.R. § 304.2(a). (1992). Copies of
the texts of Recommendations not published in part 305 may be obtained from the
Office of the Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States, 2120 L
Street, NW., Suite 500, Washington, DC 20037; telephone: (202) 254-7020.
** 57 Fed. Reg. 61,760 (1992), codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-7 (1992).
1. The term "administrative judge," as used here, includes non-ALJ hearing officers, whatever their title, who preside at adjudicatory hearings.
2. In 1969, the Conference addressed some of these issues in the context of
hearing examiners. See Conference Recommendation 69-9, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-9 (part
A) (1988). Many of the recommendations set forth here pertaining to selection and
training of ALJs are broadly consistent with the earlier recommendation, but to the
extent that they differ, this recommendation is intended to supersede part A of Recommendation 69-9.
*
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jects relevant to the adjudications over which they preside, who would
be insulated from the investigatory and prosecutorial efforts of employing agencies through protections concerning hiring, salary, and tenure, as
well as separation-of-functions requirements. The decisions of such impartial factfinders were made subject to broad review by agency heads
to ensure that the accountable appointee at the top of each agency has
control over the policymaking for which the agency has responsibility.
The need for impartial factfinders in administrative adjudications is
evident. To ensure the acceptability of the process, some degree of
adjudicator independence is necessary in those adjudications involving
some kind of hearing.3 The legitimacy of an adjudicatory process also
depends on the consistency of its results and its efficiency.
ALJs possess a degree of independence that dates back to the enactment of the APA and is governed by the APA and related statutes. The
APA provides that certain separations of functions must be observed to
protect the ALJ from improper pressures from agency investigators and
prosecutors. ALJs are selected through a special process overseen by
OPM. Their pay is set by statute and OPM regulations. Any attempt by
an agency to discipline or remove an ALJ requires a formal hearing at
the Merit Systems Protection Board. ALJs are also exempt from the
performance appraisal requirements applicable to almost all other federal
employees under the Civil Service Reform Act.
While the number of ALJs in the Federal government has leveled off
in the last decade, and has actually decreased outside of the Social
Security Administration, some agencies have been making increased use
of AJs. The amount of functional independence accorded to AJs varies
with the particular agency and type of adjudication; however, AJs generally lack the statutory protections guaranteed to ALJs. AJs are not statutorily exempt from performance appraisals, and several major groups of
AJs [regularly] undergo such appraisals by the agencies for which they
work. In general, however, AJs presiding in agency adjudications in
which a hearing is provided are accorded de facto protection from pressure from agency investigators and prosecutors, and,. according to the
Conference's survey, do not perceive themselves as significantly more
subject to agency pressure than do ALJs.
The Conference's general view is that the movement away from the
uniformity of qualifications, procedures, and protections of independence

3. The study underlying this recommendation limited its consideration to adjudicators who preside over some kind of hearing. More informal adjudication processes
are outside the scope of the study.
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that derives from using ALJs in appropriate adjudications is unfortunate.
The Conference believes that, to some extent, this movement away from
ALJs toward AJs has been fueled by perceptions among agency management of difficulties in selecting and managing ALds. These recommendations attempt to address these perceived problems. It should be noted
that these recommendations are interdependent. For example, recommendations concerning the conversion of AJ positions to ALJ positions, and
creation of new ALJ positions in new programs, are premised on the
implementation of improvements in the selection and evaluation processes.
Use of ALJs and AJs
There is no apparent rationale undergirding current congressional or
agency decisions on the use of ALJs or non-ALJs in particular types of
cases. Congress seems to make such choices on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, it is quite clear that similar types of determinations made in different agencies are being made by different types of decisionmakers. For
example, disability benefits adjudications at the Social Security Administration are handled by ALJs; at the Department of Veterans Affairs, AJs
adjudicate similar types of cases. Moreover, in some contexts, non-ALJ
adjudicators preside over cases in which extremely important issues of
personal liberty are potentially at stake, such as deportation proceedings
and security clearance cases.
The uniform structure established by the APA for on-the-record hearings and for qualifications of presiding officers serves to provide a consistency that helps furnish legitimacy and acceptance of agency adjudication. A rationalized system of determining when ALJs should be used
would encourage uniformity not only in procedure, and in the qualifications of the initial decider, but in adjudication of similar interests. The
Conference, therefore, recommends that Congress consider the conversion of AJ positions to ALJ positions in certain contexts. While the
Conference does not identify specific types of cases 'for which such
conversion should be made, it proposes a series of factors for Congress
to consider in making such determinations; these same factors should
also apply when Congress creates new programs involving evidentiary
hearings.
One critical factor is the nature of the interest being adjudicated. The
separation of functions mandated by the APA, as well as the selection
criteria designed to ensure the highest quality adjudicators, are of particular value in situations where the most important interests are at stake.
Generally speaking, a hearing that is likely to involve a substantial

616

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 7:589

impact on personal liberties or freedom, for example, is one where use
of an ALJ likely would be appropriate. Similarly, cases that could result
in an order carrying with it a criminal-like finding of culpability, imposition of sanctions with a substantial economic effect (such as large
monetary penalties or some license revocations), 4 or a determination of
discrimination under civil rights laws (unless there is an opportunity for
a de novo hearing in court) represent categories of proceedings that may
call for ALJ use. This characterization should be done for types of cases
rather than for particular cases.
Another factor to consider is whether the procedures established by
statute or by rule for cases heard and decided are, or would be, substantially equivalent to APA formal hearings. In such cases, the additional
uniformity that would derive from making the cases formally subject to
5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and 557 would argue in favor of ALJs.
ALJs are required to be lawyers. Some AJs who decide cases are not
lawyers, but have other needed specialized expertise. For example, certain adjudicators at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are physicists or
engineers who participate on multi-member boards. In determining
whether it is appropriate to use ALJs in particular types of cases, Congress should consider whether the benefits of using ALJs are outweighed
by the benefits of having other expertise brought to bear. It should also
consider whether lawyers serving with nonlawyers on decision panels
should be ALJs.
A final consideration, particularly in the context of considering conversion of existing AJ positions to ALJ positions, is the extent to which
the current adjudicators closely approximate ALJs in their decisional
independence, the criteria for their selection, or their compensation and
experience levels. If existing AJs are functioning well and do not approach parity with ALJs on these criteria, there may be no need to
make the conversion. On the other hand, if they closely match ALJs on
these factors, uniformity interests may weigh in favor of conversion.
Although none of these factors is necessarily intended to be determinative, the more that these factors weigh in favor of ALJ status for the
decisionmaker, the more appropriate it is for Congress to mandate such
status. It should be noted, however, that these recommendations are not
intended to be seen as encouraging increased formalization of administrative adjudicatory processes.
In situations where Congress does convert AJ positions to ALJ posi-

4. Grant or contract disputes would not fall within this category, unless a monetary penalty was involved.
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tions, those AJs who can satisfy OPM eligibility qualifications should be
eligible for immediate appointment as ALJs. Thus, only those existing
AJs meeting the standards for ALJ appointment would become ALJs,
but they would not be required to go through the competitive selection
process.
Historically, OPM has had responsibility to review and rule on agency requests for additional ALJ positions. In the past, when there were
government-wide limits on "supergrade" positions, which included ALJs,
this oversight role served a purpose. Those limits no longer exist, and it
is no longer necessary for OPM to participate in this process. Agencies
should be free, within their normal resource allocation constraints, to
determine for themselves whether they need more or fewer ALJs.
ALJ Selection
The selection process for ALJs has been administered by OPM (and
its predecessor agency) since 1946. OPM develops the criteria for selection, accepts applications for the register of eligibles, and rates the
applicants on the basis of their experience as described in a lengthy
statement prepared by the applicant, a personal reference inquiry, a
written demonstration of decision-writing ability, and a panel interview.
The scores from this process determine an applicant's rank on the register of eligibles. Because OPM has historically considered ALJs as being
in the competitive service, OPM follows the statutory requirements for
filling vacancies. Thus, OPM rates and ranks eligibles on a scale from
70 to 100, and when an agency seeks to fill a vacancy, OPM certifies
the top three names on the register to that agency. In practice, only
applicants with scores from 85 to 100 have been certified.
The Veterans' Preference Act, which has historically applied to most
civil service hiring, is applicable to selection of administrative law judges. As applied, veterans deemed qualified for the preference are awarded
an extra 5 points, and disabled veterans are awarded an extra 10 points
in their scores. These extra points have had an extremely large impact,
given the small range in unadjusted scores. In addition, under current
law, agencies may not pass over a veteran to hire a nonveteran with the
same or lower score on the certificate. As a consequence, application of
the veterans' preference has almost always been determinative in the
ALJ selection system.
There has been concern about the ALJ selection process, arising from
the determinative impact of veterans' preference and the very limited
selection options available to agencies. In fact, most agencies in recent
years have found ways to circumvent this process somewhat, primarily
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by hiring laterally from other agency AU offices, or (in those few
agencies that hire substantial numbers of ALJs) by waiting until there
are numerous slots to fill at one time, thus entitling them to a larger
certificate of eligibles from OPM.
Despite this circumvention, the application of veterans' preference to
the ALJ selection process has had a materially negative effect on the
potential quality of the [Flederal administrative judiciary primarily because it'has effectively prevented agencies from being able to hire representative numbers of qualified women candidates as ALJs. There is also
some evidence that application of the veterans' preference may have
adversely affected the hiring of racial minorities. Thus, agencies are
prevented from being able to select the best qualified ALJs for specific
positions from a pool of representative applicants. The Conference recognizes that the general policy of veterans' preference in Federal hiring
reflects a valid social concern, particularly as it helps those who leave
military service enter the Federal civilian workforce. But, in view of the
conflict between this policy and the valid need of Federal agencies to
have an opportunity to select the best qualified ALJs from among representative applicants, the Conference recommends that Congress abolish
veterans' preference in the particular and limited context of ALJ selection.5 In that connection, it should be noted that in 1978, Congress
created a similar narrow exemption for members of the Senior Executive
Service. Moreover, there is no veterans' preference in the selection for
any other Federal judicial position.
The Conference's recommendation on the selection of ALJs would
leave with OPM the responsibility for preparing the register of eligibles
(i.e., for determining the basic qualifications for the position and rating
the applicants). OPM is urged to ensure that all applicants placed on the
register are in fact qualified to fulfill the responsibilities of being an
ALl

In conjunction with this, however, the recommendation would also
expand the choices that agencies would have in selecting from among
those qualified applicants. Under this recommendation, after OPM rated
the applicants, it would compile a register of all applicants deemed
qualified following the final rating process. An agency could request a
certificate with the names of all applicants whose numerical ratings
placed them in the highest-ranked 50 percent of the register. Agencies

5. The Conference has recommended a similar modification to the veterans'
preference in this context before. See Conference Recommendation 69-9, 1 C.F.R. §
305.69-9 1 A(4) (1988).
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could also request a certificate containing a smaller number of names or
applicants in a higher percentile. The agency would have the authority
to hire anyone on the certificate. 6
In addition, if, following review of the highest-ranked 50 percent, an
agency needed to review additional names to find a suitable candidate, it
could request an additional certificate from OPM. Such an exception
should be invoked rarely, and only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.
The Conference recognizes that any limitation on the number of qualified candidates on the certificate, including the "top three" limitation
now in place, might be criticized as arbitrary. By recommending the
highest-ranked 50 percent of the applicants OPM has determined to be
qualified, the Conference is attempting to balance two factors. The Conference recognizes the agencies' strong interest in having a substantially
larger pool of qualified candidates from which to select ALJs who meet
their varying criteria and needs. It also recognizes the importance of
ensuring that such a pool is highly qualified, as measured by a uniform
objective rating system. The Conference believes that its recommendation provides a reasonable balance of these factors. It provides a pool
large enough that agencies should be able to find candidates for ALJ
positions who satisfy their varying and specific needs. At the same time,
OPM estimates that the top 50 percent of the register corresponds to
those applicants with scores of 85 or better out of 100.
Agencies would also have access to a computerized database that
would contain the complete application files of individual applicants on
their certificate, including numerical ratings, geographical or agency
preferences, particular kinds of experience, and veterans status. This
database would allow agencies the option to narrow the list of qualified
applicants and focus on those whom they would like to consider further.
For example, an agency could search for all candidates willing to relocate to New York City, who spoke Spanish, and had ratings in the top
20 percent.
To ensure that the register contains a broad range of qualified applicants, the Conference also recommends that OPM and hiring agencies
expand recruitment of women and minority applicants for ALJ positions.
In addition, because questions have been raised about OPM's current

6. In order to implement this recommendation, Congress would need at a minimum to modify the veterans' preference to eliminate the provision restricting the
passing over of veterans, so that agencies would have the ability to hire any qualified
applicant on the certificate.
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method of assessing litigation experience for the purposes of scoring
applicants for ALJ positions, the Conference recommends that OPM
review its rating criteria to determine whether they are appropriate.
For much of the last decade, the register has been closed, thus precluding newly interested applicants from being considered for ALJ positions. Although OPM deferred reopening the register pending the outcome of the Conference's consideration and recommendations, it has
announced that the register will be reopened in the spring of 1993.
While the Conference's recommendations would significantly affect the
ALJ selection process, the impact would come mostly at the end of the
process, after OPM has evaluated and rated the new applicants. This
procedure is likely to be a time-consuming one, given the expected large.
influx of applicants. Therefore, the Conference supports reopening the
application process, so that OPM can begin rating the candidates now,
even though the recommended changes in the later stages have not yet
been implemented. This way, when and if those changes are in place,
the updated register will be readily available. It should be noted, however, that the Conference is also recommending that OPM review some of
its rating criteria, which would need to be done before it begins rating
new applicants.
OPM has indicated that it has a planned program to expand recruitment of women and minority applicants for the register. The Conference
both encourages OPM to give such a program a high priority, and recommends that OPM and the hiring agencies take steps in particular to
recruit among minority bar associations and other institutions with large
numbers of minorities or women.
The Conference's view is that implementing these recommendations
will provide agencies the opportunity to select ALJs from a broad range
of highly qualified candidates and to hire the best applicants from a
representative register.
ALJ Evaluation and Discipline
At present, ALJs, virtually alone among Federal employees, are statutorily exempt from any performance appraisal. Although agencies may
seek removal or discipline of ALJs "for good cause" by initiating a formal proceeding at the MSPB, the Board has applied standards that have
strictly limited the contexts in which such actions may successfully be
taken against an- AL. For example, agency actions premised on low
productivity have never been successful before the Board.
The Conference recognizes the importance of independence for ALJs.
Their role under the APA as independent factfinders requires that they
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be protected from pressure in making their decisions. There can be a
tension, however, between this independence and the agency's role as
final policymaker, including the need for consistency of result and political accountability. Moreover, agencies have a legitimate interest in
being able to manage their employees, including ALJs, in order to ensure that the adjudicatory system is an efficient and fair one.
The Conference, therefore, recommends that a system of review of
AiU performance be developed. Chief ALJs would be given the responsibility to coordinate development of case processing guidelines, with the
participation of other agency ALJs, agency managers and others. These
guidelines, which would address issues such as ALJ productivity and
step-by-step time goals,7 would be one of the bases upon which Chief
ALJs would conduct regular (e.g., annual) performance reviews. Judicial
comportment and demeanor would be another basis for review. Another
factor on the list of bases for performance review, which list is not intended to be exclusive, would be the existence of a clear disregard of,
or pattern of nonadherence to, properly articulated and disseminated
rules, procedures, precedents and other agency policy. Such performance
review systems need not involve quantitative measures or specific performance levels, but they should provide meaningful and useful feedback
on performance.8
Conversely, ALJs should also have a mechanism for dealing with
legitimate concerns about improper agency infringement of, or interference with, their decisional independence. Under the Conference's recommendation, each agency employing ALJs should set up a system for
receiving and investigating allegations of such activity by agency management officials and, where warranted, referring them to the appropriate
authorities for action." OPM would have oversight responsibility, and
could, upon request by an ALJ or at its own discretion, review an
agency's response to such allegations, and recommend appropriate further action.
Under the Conference recommendation, the Chief ALJs' responsibilities would also include developing ALJ training and counseling pro-

7. See Conference Recommendation 86-7, "Case Management as a Tool for
2.
Improving Agency Adjudication," 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-7 (1992), at
8. Many states now use performance reviews for their state court judges and
ALJs. The performance of Federal magistrate-judges is evaluated as a condition of
reappointment. Even some Federal courts are beginning to experiment with evaluation
of judges' performance.
9. Such authorities might include OPM for certain lesser sanctions, and the
Office of Special Counsel or MSPB in more serious cases.
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grams designed to enhance professional capabilities and to remedy individual performance deficiencies, and, in appropriate cases, issuing reprimands or recommending disciplinary action.'"
Recently, attention has been focused on allegations of prejudice
against certain classes of litigants by some ALJs." While there is no
known evidence that such a problem is widespread, the Conference's
view is that it is important to have a mechanism for handling complaints or allegations relating to ALJ misconduct, including allegations
of bias or prejudice. The Conference, therefore, recommends that Chief
ALJs, either individually or through an ALJ peer review group, receive
and investigate such complaints or allegations, and recommend appropriate corrective or disciplinary actions. To the extent practicable, such
investigation and the processing of any corrective or disciplinary recommendation should be expedited to protect affected interests and create
public confidence in the process. Where appropriate, consensual resolutions are encouraged. The Conference also recommends that agencies
publicize the existence of their complaint procedures, in published rules
and procedures or in some other appropriate fashion, and inform complainants in a timely manner of the disposition of their complaints.
The Conference is also recommending that OPM assign the various
responsibilities relating to ALJs to a specific unit within that agency.
Such a unit would, among other things, have responsibility for overseeing personnel, hiring and performance matters involving Chief ALJs,
thus providing them additional insulation from agency pressures. Because of the increased importance of the position of Chief ALJ under
this proposal, Congress also should consider making the position subject
to a term appointment, as it has done for Chief Judges of United States
District Courts.
The Conference also recommends that proceedings before the Merit
Systems Protection Board involving charges against ALJs be heard by a
three-judge panel. Judging administrative law judges is a sensitive process, and the benefit of collegial decisionmaking in this context seems
worth the added cost. The panel should be selected. from a pool of
ALJs. Currently, MSPB has only one ALJ. So long as this is the case,

10. See 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 1 (1977) (discussing certain limitations on agency's
authority to reprimand ALJs).
11. See e.g., U'S. GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY: RACIAL DIFFERENCE IN DISABILITY
DECISIONS WARRANTS FURTHER INVESTIGATION GAO/HRD-92-56 (April 1992). Cf.
NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY REPORT (Discussion Draft)
(July 1992) at 93-103 (discussing gender bias issues relating to disability determinations).
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the pool should consist of ALJs from other agencies, but the panel in a
particular case should not involve ALJs from the same agency as the
respondent AL.
Policy Articulation
As discussed, the APA model of agency decisionmaking is based on
the use of independent ALJs to find facts and to apply agency policy to
those facts. This system requires that ALJs be granted independence as
factfinders, but it also must ensure that agency policymakers are able to
establish policies in an efficient manner for application by ALJs in
individual cases. The methods available to agencies include promulgation
of rules of general applicability, the use of a system of precedential
decision," or other appropriate practices, such as proper use of policy
statements. 3 Such policy statements must be properly disseminated.
Where the agency has made its policies known in an appropriate
fashion, ALJs and AJs are bound to apply them in individual cases.
Policymaking is the realm of the agency, and the ALJ's (or AJ's) role
is to apply such policies to the facts that the judge finds in an individual case.
The Concept of an ALJ Corps
There has been over the last decade considerable discussion of the
concept of an ALJ corps. Although there have been differences among
the specific proposals, the concept in general includes separating ALJs
from individual agencies, and placing them in a new, separate agency.
Recent legislative proposals provided, among other things, that new
ALJs would be selected by a chief judge of the corps, and that AUs
would be divided into several general subject matter divisions (such as
health and benefits; safety and environment; and communications, public
utility and transportation regulation)."'
The Conference discussed these recent legislative proposals to establish a centralized AU corps as a means of handling some of the issues
addressed in this recommendation. Some of these recommendations are
independent of such proposals; others are inconsistent with them. The
12. See Conference Recommendation 89-8. "Agency Practices and Procedures for
the Indexing and Public Availability of Adjudicatory Decisions," I C.F.R. § 305.89-8
(1992)
1 at n.2.
13. See Conference Recommendation 92-2, "Agency Policy Statements," 57 Fed.
Reg. 30,101, 30,103 (1992), to be codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2.
14. See S. 826 and H.R. 3910, 102d Cong.
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Conference concluded that there is no basis at this time for structural
changes more extensive than those proposed here.
RECOMMENDATION

I. Congressionally Mandated Use of ALJs and AJs 5
A. When Congress considers new or existing programs that involve
agency on-the-record adjudications, it should seek to preserve the uniformity of process and of qualifications of presiding officers contemplated by the APA, by providing for the use of administrative law judges
(ALJs) in all appropriate circumstances.' 6 In order to further this goal,
Congress should consider converting certain existing administrative judge
(AJ) positions 7 to ALJ positions. In determining the appropriateness of
converting existing AJ positions to AU status and of requiring the use
of AUJs in particular types of new adjudications, Congress should consider the following factors, if present, as indicia to weigh in favor of
requiring ALJ status:
1. The cases to be heard and decided are likely to involve:
a. Substantial impact on personal liberties or freedom;
b. Orders that carry with them a finding of criminal-like culpability;
c. Imposition of sanctions with substantial economic effect; or
d. Determination of discrimination under civil rights or other analogous laws.
2. The procedures established by statute or regulation for the cases
heard and decided are, or would be, the functional equivalent of APA
formal hearings.
3. The deciders in such cases are, or ought to be, lawyers-taking
into consideration the possibility that some programs might require other
types of specialized expertise on the part of adjudicators or on panels of
adjudicators.
4. Those incumbent AJs in such cases who are required to be lawyers
already meet standards for independence, selection, experience, and
compensation that approximate those accorded to ALJs.
B. When Congress determines that it should require ALJs to preside

15. The recommendations in this Part I are interdependent with those of Parts II
and III urging improvements in the selection and evaluation processes for ALJs.
16. This recommendation is not intended to be seen as encouraging increased formalization of administrative adjudicatory processes.
17. The term "administrative judge," as used here, includes non-ALJ hearing officers, whatever their title, who preside at adjudicatory hearings.

1993l

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY

over hearings in specific classes of existing [F]ederal agency adjudications at which ALJs do not now preside, it should specify that those
AJs presiding over such proceedings at that time who can satisfy the
Office of Personnel Management's eligibility qualifications for ALJs be
eligible for immediate appointments as ALJs.
C. Congress should provide that OPM should no longer be responsible for reviewing and ruling on agency requests for additional ALJ positions. Decisions relating to an agency's need for more or fewer ALJ positions should be made by the individual agencies through the normal
resource allocation process.
II. ALJ Selection
A. Congress should authorize where required, and OPM should establish, a process for the selection of qualified ALJs by federal agencies
that contains the following elements:
1. OPM should continue to administer the process for determining
whether applicants are qualified to be on the register of eligibles for
ALJ positions and for rating such applicants. OPM should ensure that
all applicants appearing on the register are in fact qualified to fulfill the
duties of an ALJ under applicable law, including that they have the
capability and willingness to provide impartial, independent factfinding
and decisionmaking. To the extent that this may require revising the
examination process, OPM should make the appropriate changes.
2. Those applicants determined by OPM to be qualified should be
listed on the register with their numerical scores noted. Agencies seeking
to fill ALJ positions should be allowed to request a certificate containing the names of those applicants whose numerical ratings place them in
the highest-ranking 50 percent of the register of eligible applicants.
Agencies should have the discretion to request a certificate with a smaller number of percentage of the register. Agencies should also be given
access to a computerized database containing the complete application
files of those applicants on the certificate.
3. A hiring agency should be permitted to select any applicant from
the certificate who, in the agency's opinion, possesses the qualifications
for the particular position to be filled. An agency may request that OPM
provide an additional number of names upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances.
B. OPM and the hiring agencies should give a high priority to expanding recruitment of women and minority applicants for ALJ positions. OPM also should review its ALJ application criteria to determine
whether its current method of assessing litigation experience is appropri-
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ate.
C. OPM immediately should implement Parts II (A)(1) and (B),
which may involve revisions to the examination or scoring process.
Pending implementation of the other recommendations in this Part, OPM
should open the register application process as soon as possible, and
keep it open continuously.
D. In order to implement the proposals in paragraphs II (A) and (B)
above, Congress should abolish the veterans' preference in ALJ selection.
III. ALJ Evaluation and Discipline
Congress should authorize, where necessary, and OPM and the agencies that employ ALJs should establish, the following processes for
assisting ALJs and the agencies that employ them to carry out their
responsibilities to the public and to individual parties:
A.

Organization

1. OPM should assign a specific unit the responsibility for (a) overseeing those matters concerning the selection of ALJs, (b) overseeing all
personnel, hiring and performance matters that involve Chief ALJs, (c)
acting on allegations of improper interference with decisional independence of ALJs, (d) conducting regular performance reviews of Chief
ALJs, and (e) periodically publishing reports on the effectiveness with
which OPM's responsibilities are performed and seeking recommendations as to how the program may be improved.
2. Each agency that employs more than one ALJ should designate a
Chief ALJ, who is given the responsibility within the agency to do the
tasks assigned to the Chief ALJ under this Part Ill.8
3. OPM should provide guidance and assistance to aid Chief ALJs
fulfilling the responsibilities given to them under this Part III.
4. OPM and the agencies should ensure that Chief ALJs are insulated
from improper agency influence when carrying out the responsibilities
described in this Part III.' 9

18. In agencies with large numbers of ALJs, the Chief ALI might appropriately
delegate some or all such responsibility to deputy or regional chief ALJs.
19. Congress also should consider making the position of Chief AL subject to a
term appointment. This suggestion does not result from a finding by the Conference
that any number of current Chief ALJs are not functioning effectively. The Conference notes, however, that Chief Judges of United States District Courts are subject to
term appointments and believes it is appropriate to consider whether a similar limita-
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Evaluation and Training

Chief ALJs should be given the authority to:
1. Develop and oversee a training and counseling program for ALJs
designed to enhance professional capabilities and to remedy individual
performance deficiencies.
2. Coordinate the development of case processing guidelines, with the
participation of other agency ALJs, agency managers and, where available, competent advisory groups.
3. Conduct regular ALJ performance reviews based on relevant factors, including case processing guidelines, judicial comportment and
demeanor, and the existence, if any, of a clear disregard of or pattern of
nonadherence to properly articulated and disseminated rules, procedures,
precedents, and other agency policy.
4. Individually, or through involvement of an ALJ peer review group
established for this purpose, provide appropriate professional guidance,
including oral or written reprimands, and, where good cause appears to
exist, recommend that disciplinary action against ALJs be brought by the
employing agency at the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), based
on such performance reviews.
C. Complaints About ALJs
Each agency that employs ALJs should set up a system for receiving
and evaluating complaints or allegations of misconduct by an ALJ, including bias or prejudice.
1. The Chief ALJ in each agency, individually or through involvement of an ALJ peer review group established for this purpose, should
be given responsibility for receiving and investigating such complaints.
2. If a Chief ALJ determines that ALJ misconduct occurred, the Chief
AU should recommend that the agency take appropriate corrective action, or, in appropriate cases, recommend that disciplinary action against
the ALJ be brought by the agency at the MSPB.
3. If a Chief ALJ determines that further investigation by another
authority is warranted, he or she should refer the case to that authority.
4. Each agency should make known to interested persons in an appropriate fashion the existence of such complaint procedure.
5. Where allegations of misconduct implicate a Chief ALJ, they
should be referred to OPM for such investigation and recommended

tion should apply to Chief ALJs.
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action.
6. Complainants should be given notice of the disposition of their
complaints.
D. Complaints by ALJs
Each agency that employs ALJs should set up a system for receiving
and investigating allegations of unlawful agency infringement on ALJ
decisional independence or other improper interference in the fulfillment
of ALJ responsibilities. Such a system should be subject to OPM oversight. Where investigation reveals the probable occurrence of such an
impropriety, the matter should be referred to the appropriate authority
for review and recommended action designed to remedy the situation
and prevent recurrence, including the issuance of oral or written reprimands and other appropriate sanctions.
E. MSPB Panels
MSPB should assign cases involving charges against ALJs to a threejudge panel of ALJs drawn from a pool. No judge on the panel should
be from the same agency as the respondent ALJ.
IV.

POLICY ARTICULATION

To ensure that ALJs and affected persons are aware of their responsibilities, agencies should articulate their policies through rules of general
applicability, a system of precedential decisions, or other appropriate
practices.2' Congress, the President, and the courts should encourage
such policy articulation.
V.

THE CONCEPT OF AN ALJ CORPS

Congress should not at this time make structural changes more extensive than those proposed here, such as those in recent legislative proposals to establish a centralized corps of ALJs.

20. See generally Conference Recommendation 71-2, "Articulation of Agency
Policies," 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-2 (1992); Conference Recommendation 87-7, "A New
Role for the Social-Security Appeals Council," 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-7 (1992); Conference Recommendation 89-8, "Agency Practices and Procedures for the Indexing and
Public Availability of Adjudicatory Decisions," 1 C.F.R. § 305.89-8 (1992); Conference Recommendation 92-2, "Agency Policy Statements," 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,103
(1992), to be codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2 (1992).

